Small Employer Health Insurance Pools by Hogan, Andrew J. & Woodbury, Stephen A.
Upjohn Institute Press 
Small Employer Health 
Insurance Pools 
Andrew J. Hogan 
Michigan State University 
Stephen A. Woodbury 
Michigan State University and 
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
Chapter 5.2 (pp. 103-114) in: 
Improving Access to Health Care: What Can the States Do? 
John H. Goddeeris, and Andrew J. Hogan, eds. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1992 
DOI: 10.17848/9780880995733.ch5.2 




Andrew J. Hogan 
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University
Need for Small Employer Health Insurance Pools
Characteristics of Uninsured 
and Underinsured Employees
Almost 60 percent of nonelderly adults without health insurance are 
employed (Swartz 1989). Almost half of these employed uninsured adults 
live in families with less than 200 percent of poverty income, and nearly 
two-thirds of them are employed by small firms, generally earning low 
wages (Moyer 1989).
The Health Insurance Survey of Michigan (Figure 1) indicates that 
less than half of all employees of small firms (fewer than 100 employees) 
have adequate health insurance coverage. About 20 percent are underin- 
sured, in that physician's office visits are not covered or as evidenced 
by problems with inadequate coverage in the past year. Another 25 per 
cent have adequate insurance but are only marginally insured, in that 
they have either nongroup coverage purchased with after-tax income 
or their employers make no contribution toward their premium. Ten 
percent of employees of small firms have coverage that is both marginal 
and inadequate.
Employed persons with nongroup coverage are likely to relinquish 
that coverage when small employer pool group coverage is offered. 
Firms offering poor health benefit coverage may replace it with coverage 
offered by the pool. Further, many employees in small firms, who are 
currently covered under a spouse's health plan, may decide to switch 
to coverage in their own name through their employer from the pool.
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Adequacy of Health Insurance Coverage 
by Firm Size
<10 10-24 25-100 >100
firm size (# of employees)
adequate [ | underins marg/adeq marg/under
Source: Health Insurance Survey of Michigan
Key
adequate: good coverage with significant employer contribution
underins: underinsured, physician office visits not covered, or problems encountered 
during last year.
marg/adeq: good coverage, with no employer contribution or nongroup coverage 
marg/under: underinsured, with no employer contribution or nongroup coverage.
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Characteristics of Small Employer 
Health Insurance Market
A recent survey of Michigan insurance carriers revealed that small 
employers (< 100 FTEs) may pay premiums from 10 percent to 40 per 
cent higher than the 500 + FTE firm for equivalent coverage (Health 
Management Associates 1989). Interestingly, the employees of small 
firms tend to be younger (and perhaps healthier) than their medium- 
and large-firm counterparts (Hogan 1989), which could make small 
employer health insurance premiums even more actuarially unfair than 
the simple premium differential might indicate.
As health insurance premiums have become increasingly less afford 
able, both small firms and insurance carriers have developed strategies 
to avoid the risk of paying for adverse selection. In the small firm, one 
significant illness can lead to a very adverse loss ratio for the carrier. 
Carriers will attempt to avoid this risk prospectively by various under 
writing approaches: exclusion of pre-existing conditions, exclusion of 
employees with pre-existing conditions or even termination of the policy 
once serious conditions are identified.
Carriers not adopting these strategies would soon find themselves in 
undated by demand from excluded firms. The resulting adverse selec 
tion will quickly cause unfavorable loss ratios, leading to rising 
premiums. If the premiums are community-rated, then there will be 
a flight of small firms without significant risks to those carriers offer 
ing lower premiums with restrictive underwriting practices.
Over the years these strategies have led to an enormous churning in 
the small employer health insurance market. Small employers change 
carriers readily, and carriers selling to small employers offer limited 
products which are heavily underwritten and whose premiums often 
escalate quickly after a year or two. Many large carriers have aban 
doned the small employer market altogether. Larger employers have 
also abandoned the health insurance market to avoid sharing the risk of 
adverse selection and are now almost always under some kind of exper 
ience-rated or self-funded arrangement (Gabel et al. 1989). In summary, 
the employment-based health insurance market has come to rest primar 
ily on small and medium employers purchasing from small and medium
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carriers, all of whom have as a major strategy the management of adverse 
selection. In some states, such as Michigan, Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
plans are required to act as insurers of last resort and to insure a signifi 
cant number of small firms.
The high level of carrier-client churning has contributed to the high 
administrative costs in the small employer health insurance market. As 
turbulent as the small employer health insurance market is, it is not 
surprising that small employers have not organized themselves well to 
deal with one of the major forces in the health care financing in the 
1980s: cost-shifting. In the early 1980s, federal and state governments 
began enacting legislation and administrative rules to limit their liabili 
ty for health care cost inflation; this came after a decade of unsuccessful 
attempts to contain health care costs. The Medicare and Medicaid pro 
grams changed their reimbursement policies from cost-plus to fixed fees. 
After years of budgetary restraint, these fees are now significantly below 
those paid by private insurers (Thorpe, Siegel, Dailey 1989). Whether 
these fees have fallen below the cost of care is a matter of some dispute. 
However, once the separation was made between costs and payments 
for two large payers, other payers began to follow suit. Large employers 
have been able to leverage their size either with carriers and third-party 
administrators or through group purchasing arrangements to gain 
preferential treatment. The result has been that large employer premiums 
have been increasing at one-half the rate of small employer premiums 
(Kramon 1989). Small employers have been unable to defend their in 
terests in this process of cost-shifting.
Rationale for Small Employer Health Insurance Pool
The pool attempts to give small employers some of the advantages 
that large employers enjoy in the health insurance market: elimination 
of underwriting and exclusions, an organized response to cost-shifting 
and premium differentials, and an improved benefit design. By joining 
together, small employers can create a self-funded multiple employer 
welfare trust that should, over time, bring their health benefit expenses 
in line with actual costs. Such a self-funded plan can resist cost-shifting 
and will provide a reasonably stable source of insurance coverage for 
small employers.
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The major challenge for such a pool is the large number of "high- 
risk" individuals purchasing group or nongroup coverage who will rush 
into the pool if premiums are set at a level to entice "good risk" small 
employers not currently offering benefits to join. Adverse selection prob 
lems could be severe, and the small employer program could easily 
become a "high-risk" pool. In addition to adverse selection, the small 
employer pool will need to contend with the high level of employee 
turnover and financial instability of small firms (Health Management 
Associates 1989; Brown 1989). For these reasons, some public sub 
sidy will be required to offset the costs of the high-risk individuals who 
will join the pool in disproportionate numbers.
Given the large number of small firms currently offering benefits who 
are either paying a high percent of payroll for the benefit or who are 
purchasing an inferior benefit, a small employer pool is likely, upon 
offering a reasonably priced plan, to be inundated by small employers 
who currently offer benefits and who qualify for subsidies. Such a pro 
gram could spend substantial subsidies and not appreciably affect the 
number of uninsured individuals. A major policy consideration is the 
suggestion that the small employer pool be open only to employers who 
do not currently offer health benefits. In the long run, excluding 
employers who currently offer health benefits from participation in the 
program is probably unfair, but the approach may be workable as a 
transitional measure. 1
An additional policy issue is whether an employee must work some 
minimum number of hours per week to qualify for health insurance. 
Other things being equal, participation of part-time workers increases 
premium costs more than it increases payroll, resulting in more sub 
sidy payments if premiums are to be affordable.
Administration of Small Employer 
Health Insurance Programs
One approach is the creation of a small business health insurance pool 
open to all businesses with less than 25 employees, new businesses (< 1 
year) with less than 100 employees, and the self-employed. The state 
insurance bureau could annually determine actuarially fair premiums 
plus administrative loadings for the small business pool. Premiums
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should not be experience-rated to encourage coverage for high-risk 
employees, if subsidies can be obtained.
To make the purchase of health insurance more attractive to the small 
employer, premiums can be subsidized as a percent of total payroll. 
Eligible employers would pay full premiums as long as the total health 
benefit expense is less than, for example, 4 percent of payroll. Employers 
would pay 50 percent of the total premiums in excess of 4 percent but 
less than 8 percent of payroll, and they would pay 10 percent of total 
premiums in excess of 8 percent of payroll. To reduce free-riding, at 
least 75 percent of a firm's uninsured workers would have to be covered 
for a firm to receive such a subsidy. Employers providing evidence of 
financial distress could be allowed to delay or reduce premium payments 
up to one year. Employers may require employees to share in the pay 
ment of premiums, as long as the employee earns at least 125 percent 
of the federal minimum wage. 2 Employer premium contributions must 
at least equal employee premium contributions for the firm to receive 
a premium subsidy.
An alternative subsidy mechanism is to make subsidy payments directly 
to employees and to base the amount of the subsidy on the economic 
status of the employee and his or her dependents. Employees with 
household incomes less than 200 percent of poverty would receive 
premium subsidies to supplement their own or their employer's premium 
contributions. Eligible employers could pay full premiums for all 
employees whose family income exceeds 200 percent of poverty 
income. For those between 100 and 200 percent of poverty:
Premium share = Adjusted family income _ L 
Poverty rate income
A somewhat more modest alternative approach is to extend the Health 
Care Access Project (HCAP) being undertaken in Genesee and Mar- 
quette Counties in the State of Michigan (Smith 1989). The HCAP pro 
gram is one of 15 Robert Wood Johnson access demonstration projects. 
The program is open to employers who do not now offer health benefits 
and it uses existing insurance mechanisms (usually the local Chamber 
of Commerce area-rated group plans offered by Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
of Michigan). HCAP subsidizes up to one-third of the total premium
Small Employer Health Insurance Pools 109
contribution for eligible establishments. HCAP will further subsidize 
some or all of the employee premium contribution based on family 
income.
In spite of fairly generous premium subsidies, HCAP and other ac 
cess demonstration projects have been able to enroll only about 20 per 
cent of eligible employers contacted (Perry 1989). The chief advan 
tages of the HCAP-type approach are their reliance on existing insurance 
programs and the easily understood one-third subsidy. Subsidies based 
on health benefit expense as a percent of payroll or on family income 
better target the subsidy dollar and will probably produce higher par 
ticipation in the long run, but will be harder to understand and more 
expensive to administer in the short run.
Benefit Options
Selection of a small employer pool benefit package is, by necessity, 
market driven. The package must be acceptable to those who buy it, 
but it must not be so rich that it creates more health care cost inflation 
by causing the coverage offered by firms currently providing benefits 
to expand. Thus, the package selected is slightly below that typically 
offered by small employers.
Two possible benefit packages can be considered: a full benefit plan 
and a plan covering only outpatient services. Either policy offered by 
the insurance pool should cover employees and dependents. The full 
health insurance policy offered by the pool would cover inpatient hospital 
room and board, surgical care, diagnostic x-ray and laboratory, and 
emergency room care. Both plans will cover outpatient diagnostic 
and preventive services, laboratory and x-ray, physician office visits, 
prescription drugs and home health care. The plans should have modest 
deductibles and copayments for most services to maintain utilization 
within the financial means of low-income employees.
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NOTES
1. Under the Robert Wood Johnson-financed Health Care Access project (HCAP) demonstration 
in the Michigan counties of Genesee and Marquette, there is no incentive for an employer to drop 
current coverage in order to qualify for participation in the program because of the limited time 
frame of the demonstration and the uncertainties about the future. With a permanent program, 
an employer could more reasonably choose to drop health insurance in the short run to receive 
the long-term subsidies offered by the program
2. Employee premium contributions are not an effective cost-containment measure when there 
is only one plan to choose and should be used sparingly with poverty groups. Copayments and 
deductibles are more effective in limiting excessive health care utilization, but again the low- 
income levels of many of the uninsured make reliance on these cost-containment mechanisms 
onerous
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Appendix to Chapter 5.2
Small Employer Pool Percent of Payroll Subsidy
Figure A. 1 illustrates how the premium subsidy mechanism will work. Sup 
pose a small employer has one employee earning $1,000 per month in total 
compensation, $100 of which is used to pay for health insurance. The first 
4 percent of gross payroll ($40) is paid by the workplace (employer and 
employee may share this expense). The next 4 percent of payroll (from 4 per 
cent to 8 percent) is divided evenly between the workplace and the subsidy, 
$20 each. The last 2 percent of payroll (8 percent to 10 percent) is paid 90 
percent by the subsidy ($18) and 10 percent by the workplace ($2). The 
workplace expense is then $40+$20+$2=$62. The subsidy expense is 
$0+$20+$18=$38. If the worker were to earn only $500, the subsidy would 
grow to $0+$10+$54=$64. If the worker earns $2,000/month, the subsidy 
would fall to $0+$10+$0=$10.
Small Employer Pool Family Income Subsidy
All employees of small employers participating in the pool can apply for 
premium subsidies. For employees with incomes less than 200 percent of pover 
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Figure A2
Premium Shares: Small Employer Pool 
by Income Category
100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 
INCOME AS % OF POVERTY INCOME
subsidy workplace
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